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In discussions of animal rights, the
issue of predation is usually raised as
the basis for a reductio ad absurdum
objection:
(1)
Suppose humans were
obligated to alleviate avoidable
animal suffering.
(2)
Animals suffer when
they are preyed upon by other
animals.
(3)
Therefore,
humans
would be obligated to prevent
predation.
(4) But such an obligation
would be absurd.
(5) Therefore, contrary to
hypothesis,
humans are not
obligated to alleviate: avoidable
animal sufferi ng.
There are three ways in which this
argument may be successfully count
ered:
I.

least, they are not sufficiently
rational
to
recognize
and
respond to moral obligations.
Therefore, _a moral obligation
for humans to alleviate avoida
ble animal suffering
cannot
entail an obligation for animals
not to be predatory.
Th is response attempts to follow the
second strategy noted above.
That
is, it challenges the inference from
(1) to (3) in th e predation reductio.
The problem with this response is
that it misinterprets (3).
The con
cl us ion reached in (3) is not that ani
mats are obligated to stop being pred
ators.
(3) asserts that we are
obligated to prevent predation.
Con
sequently, the inference from (1) to
(3) does not even raise the issue of a
moral obligation had by predatory ani
mals which they should somehow rec
ognize and observe.

Challenging the evaluation in

(4),

Challenging that (3) follows
fro m ( 1) and (2),
III.
Challenging that (5) follows
from (1) th rou g h ( 4) .
II.

I shall develop each of these response
strategies in tu rn.
But before doing
so, I want to spend a moment dis
cussing
and
dismissing
some
not
uncommon, faulty responses to the
predation reductio.
One such reponse runs as follows:
Moral. obligations are directed
towa rd rational agents, who
can inhibit or extend their
activity in recognition of those
obligations.
But animals are
not rational agents,
or, at

It might be countered that it does
not make sense to conclude that we
have an obligation to prevent animals
from being predators unless they are
obligated not to be predators.
It
would then follow that even if the
inference from (1) to (3) does not
involve an explicit claim that animals
are subjects of moral obligation, it
presumes that they are.
Such a counter-argument would be
mistaken.
There is no conceptual
problem with the idea that we} as
moral agents, should be obligated to
prevent others, who are not moral
agents, from doing harm.
We rou
tinely apply this idea when we hold
parents
responsible for preventing
their pre-moral children from doing
harm. That a young child "does not
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know any better" does not prevent us
from having an obligation to stop
him/her from tormenting the cat. So,
that the cat does not know any better
cannot prevent us from having an
obligation to stop him/her from killing
birds. Consequently, this attempt to
defeat the inference from (1) to (3)
fa iI s .

those actions.
That they were com
mitted by the criminally insane does
not make cases of unjustified homicide
and forced sexual intercourse morally
neutral; they are still cases of murder
and rape.
Being unable to distinguish right
from wrong may leave the agent
"innocent, in the sense of "not cul
pable," but it does not leave his/her
actions "innocent," in the sense of
"bei ng neither right nor wrong. "
Those actions may still be right or
wrong; it is just that the agent can
not recognize this.
While Kantians
are correct when they emphasize that
actions done for different reasons may
have different moral values, they are
not correct when they conclude that
the entire moral value of an action
derives from the agent's wi II.
There
are agent-independent dimensions to
our moral evaluations, such as those
concerning
the
consequences
of
action s, as well as agent-dependent
dimensions. 1
Consequently,
there
could be a wrong for us to right in
predation, even if that wrong cannot
be the animals' failure to fulfill their
moral obligations.
So, this second
response to the predation reductio
also fails.
t!

A second faulty response to the
predation reductio runs something like
this:
Since animals cannot be obli
gated not to be predators,
there is nothing wrong with
their being predators. But we
cannot be morally obligated to
prevent predation, if the re is
nothing wrong with it.
This objection impl icitly cha Ilenges the
moral significance of (2) in the preda
tion reductio by presuming that the
moral value of an action derives
entirely from the agent's responding
or not responding to moral rules.
That
presumption
is
mista ken.
Consider once again the example of a
young child tormenting a cat.
The
child may be too young to recognize
and respond to humane moral obliga
tions. However, while this may influ
ence our evaluation of his/her charac
ter and responsibility for his/her
action s, it does not lead us to con
elude that there is nothing wrong with
his/her tormenting the cat. Torment
ing cats remains a wrong, whether it
is done by someone who "ought to
know better" or by someone who
"can't tell right from wrong."
To
take another example, if we determine
that someone is criminally insane,
i.e., is incapable of distinguishing
right from wrong, this affects our
evaluation of his/her responsibility for
his/her actions and whether he/she
deserves punishment for them.
How
ever, it does not read us to conclude
that there was noth i ng wrong with

The last of the common but faulty
responses we will consider runs as
follows:
In being predators, animals are
just following their nature. We
should
respect the
natural
needs and impulses of others.
Therefore,
we
should
not
interfere with predation.
This t'esponse again challenges the
moral significance of (2) in the preda
tion reductio, this time by presuming
that respecting nature has a higher
priority among our moral values than
does preventing suffering.
At the very least, this presumption
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is not obviously true. 2 One of the
fundamental and pervasive functions
of moral rules and education is to
delimit and inhibit the ways in which
native needs may be fu Ifi lied a nd nat
ural impulses may be pursued. Espe
cially when some of us "doing what
comes naturallyll results in the suffer
ing or death of others, the standard
moral response is that here is an
aspect or expression of human nature
wh ich does not merit ou r respect.
Examples of this would be our lack of
moral respect for and many efforts to
delimit and inhibit our tendencies to
aggression and dominance.
We may
also note that we simply do not accept
this third response when our pets or
chil'dren are the intended victims of
predators, as occasionally happens
when we ventu re into thei r territory
or when, by destroyi ng thei r habi
tats, we leave them no other survival
option than to ventu re into ou r com
munities in search of prey. When it
comes to ou r loved ones, we clea rly
give higher priority to preventing
suffering and death than to respecting
natu re.
Thus, this third response to the
predation reductio assigns a priority
to the natural which is not confirmed
by common moral practice. While this
does not invalidate the argument, it
does show that such an argument has
a heavy burden of proof to meet
before it poses a serious challenge to
the predation reductio.
It also sug
gests that this argument is disingenu
ous, as are so many other "it's only
natural" references in moral discus
sions.
When our interests or the
interests of those we ca re for wi II be
hurt, we do not recognize a moral
obligation to "let nature take its
cou rse," but when we do not want to
be bothered with an obligation, "that's
just the way the world works" pro
vides a handy excu se.
I shall now develop in turn each of
the three response strategies noted at
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the beginning of this paper. Each of
these strategies provides an answer
sufficient to defuse the predation
reductio. The reason for taking time
to deal with all three of them is that
in addition to dealing with the preda
tion issue, they provide opportunities
for reflecting on g~neral questions
concerning the logic of moral reason
i ng.
Each of these responses raises,
and resolves in a different way, the
question of the practical significance
of the absurd in moral reasoning.

I.
Would an obligation
predation be absu rd?

to

prevent

Conjuring up a picture of militant
animal rightists fanning out across
land and sea to protect mice from
snakes and owls, rabbits from hawks
and foxes,
fish
from bears
and
sharks, and otherwise making the
world safe for the small and the her
bivorous can easily make an obligation
to prevent predation appea r a bs u rd.
But appearances can be deceiving.
What is commonly lost in the laugh of
the predation reductio is that there
are several different ways in which
something can be absurd and that the
legitimacy of the evaluation in (4)
cannot be ascertained until we know
just which of these forms of absurdity
is being asserted.
When philosophers (perhaps, oth
ers, too) think of absurdity, the first
th i ng that comes to mi nd is logical
absurdity.
However, that certainly
cannot be the sense of the term that
is being employed in
(4).
That
humans should attempt to prevent
predation is not in a class with
attempting to square the circle, make
two plus two equal five, or have a
sentence be both true and false at the
same time and place and in the same
way. The classic form of the reductio
ad absurdum argument requires that
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the
conclusion
entailed
by
the
hypothesis in question contradict some
basic principle of reasoning, such as
the laws of geometry, a rithmetic, or
logic. That humans ought to prevent
predation does not violate any such
law of reasoning and is, therefore,
not logically absu rd.
A more modern form of the reductio
is the use of hypothetical-deductive
reasoning to falsify scientific hypoth
eses.
In this sort of reductio, the
conclusion entailed by the hypothesis
must be contra ry to what is observed
in fact.
But (3) does not contain a
factual claim, e. g. , about the exis
tence of a legal statute obligating us
to prevent predation.
Rather, (3)
contains an imperative directing us to
undertake such prevention. Since (3)
does not contain a factual claim, it
ca n not be contra ry to some matte r of
fact.
Consequently, (3) is not "fac
tually absurd," either.
Recent studies of the use of pa ra
digms in science suggest yet another
way in which a reductio may work.
The proposed conclusion may contra
dict some thorough Iy accepted theory,
the principles of which seem much less
questionable than the hypothesis from
which
the
offending
conclusion
derives.
Then,
forced to choose
between
the
thoroughly
accepted
theory and the more questionable
hypothesis, we will feel justified in
rejecting that
hypothesis on
the
grounds that what it entails is "theo
retically absurd." For example, if the
conclusions
of
one's
cosmological
theorizing contradicted contemporary
quantum mechanics, those conclusions
would likely be considered unworthy
of serious consideration and the bases
for them be dismissed.
This sort of
absu rdity is like logical absu rdity, the
difference being that here the princi
ples contradicted may be substantive
ones, whereas those contradicted in
the fi rst case were strictly formal
principles.

30

In the case at hand, environmental
ethicists who hold that "a thing is
right when it tends to preserve the
integrity, stability, and beauty of the
biotic community, [and] it is wrong
when
it tends
otherwise" 3
wou Id
doubtless find an obligation to prevent
predation to be theoretically absurd.
However, such a n eva Iuation cou Id not
be sustained, since the above envi
ronmental principle does not enjoy
anything like the wide acceptance that
the basis for an evaluation of theoret
ical absurdity must possess.
Indeed,
that environmental principle is so con
trary to paradigm ethical principles,
e.g., in giving intrinsic moral value
to ina n imate objects, that it i·s much
likely to be the object of a theoretical
reductio than the basis for one.
Of cou rse, I shall not even try to
provide a complete su rvey of other
possible bases for labelling an obliga
tion to prevent predation theoretically
absurd.
I shall just note that the
humane principle in (1) is very widely
accepted today, even if just what fol
lows from that principle is still a mat
ter
of
considerable
controversy.
Usually; it is not the obligation in (1)
but interpretations of "avoidable" and
"suffering" within that obligation and
questions about whether there are
rights correlated with this obligation
which are at issue. Consequently, it
is highly doubtful that there is any
moral theory wh ich is so much more
thoroughly accepted than our obliga
ti.on to alleviate avoidable animal suf
fering that it cou Id serve as the basis
for discrediting that humane obligation
on the grounds that (3) contradicts
that theory and is, therefore, theo
retically absurd.
Rather, if there is
such a contrary theory, we would
(initially, at least) be left in a condi
tion of moral perplexity, with widely
accepted principles entailing contrary
obi igation s . So, even if (3) were to
contradict the principles of some ethi
cal theory, it would not "follow that it
could properly be characterized as
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"theoretically absurd."
Principles of
humane morality are probably too
widely accepted nowadays to permit a
theoretical reductio of them.
Another way in which (3) might be
absurd could be labelled "contextual
absurdity.1! A conclusion is contextu
ally absurd if it contradicts (the
spirit of) one or more of its premises.
It might be a rgued that what is
absurd about (3) is that in attempting
to prevent predation, we would cause
much more suffering than we would
prevent.
Most obviously, we would
have to frustrate predators and per
haps even drive many of them to
extinction (in the wild).
Further
more, we would have to control the
population explosion among the former
prey which our prevention of preda
tion would
occasion.
This would
require frustrating many of these ani
mals, too, and would probably neces
sitate subjecting some of them to the
trauma of surgery to sterilize them.
As to just how bleak the indirect
consequences of eliminating predation
might be, I will not quibble, because
this sort of objection is easily and
reasonably met by reformulating (3)
as follows:
(3') Therefore, humans would
be obligated to prevent preda
tion whenever doing so would
not occasion as much or more
suffering than it would pre
vent.
(3') does not represent a retreat from
the moral stance being advocated in
(1).
(3') merely makes explicit how
(3) must be interpreted, since (3) is
to be a consequence of (1).
(1)
refers to alleviating animal suffering,
and this would not be accomplished if
preventi ng the sufferi ng caused by
predation caused animals even greater
suffering.
Hence, only if (3) is
interpreted as (3') does it validly fol
low from (1) and (2).

It might be countered that while
(3') meets the contextual objection, it
does so by postulating a vacuous obli
gation, since there are no cases of
predation which would fall under it.
However, that is not true. (3') would
immediately obligate us to prevent ou r
pets from being predators.
It would
also obligate us to begin exploring
other ways in which we could reudce
the suffet~ing caused by predation
without occasioning as much or more
suffering, e.g., in zoos, wildlife pre
serves, and other areas where we are
already managing· animals.
Th us, (3') contai n s a su bsta ntive
obligation which is in the spirit of our
obligation to alleviate avoidable animal
suffering.
Consequently; if contex
tual absurdity is the claim in (4), it
is unwarranted, and we can make this
immediately clear by substituting (3')
for (3).
However, contextual absu rdity does
suggest yet another way in which (3')
might be absurd:
"practical absurd
ity." As Kant asserts, "ought implies
can;" so, an obligation is practically
absurd, if it commands us to do some
thing we cannot do.
Now, it really
does seem inconceivable that we will
ever be able to eliminate predation.
Other than by eliminating carnivorous
and omnivorous wildlife entirely, h9W
are we to stop predators trom catch
ing rodents in the highland valleys of
the Rockies and big fish from eating
little fish in the ocean depths? Only
God can see--and could prevent--each
sparrow's fall.
Once again, this objection is not as
serious as it appears to be. That a
condition is one we cannot attain does
not disqualify it from being a useful
moral ideal.
For example, Ch ristian
ethics instructs us to follow Christ's
example, even though we can never
be as good as Christ, since He was
divine ahd we are not.
Similarly,
Ka nt
asserts
that
the
ultimate
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obligation in morality is to become a
holy will, which is something we can
never do, since we are not purely
rational beings but have a sensuous
nature, as well.
Kant makes this
situation practical by interpreting that
ultimate moral obligation as an obliga
tion for us to strive to approximate
ever more closely to the unattainable
ideal of being holy. 4
Such examples indicate that what is
requi red of a practical moral ideal is
not that it be attainable but merely
that it be something we can work
toward. As noted in the discussion of
contextual absurdity, this is a condi
tion that the obligation to prevent'
predation ca n meet.
So, even if we
cannot foresee ourselves being able to
stop predation entirely, the obligation
to prevent predation ca n sti II fu n ction
as a moral ideal guiding what we can
do.
Consequently, it is not practi
cally absurd.
This would seem to leave only the
idea that (3') is absurd because it
would direct humans to overstep their
proper place in the world.
It might
be claimed that in even pursuing (3')
as a moral ideal, we would be working
toward attaining God-like control over
nature, something which is not merely
impractical but a false ideal for our
moral endeavors.
Basically, this sort of objection is
nothing
more than
purple prose.
Appeals to what is "natural and
proper" have been pressed as objec
tions to vi rtua Ily every mora lin nova
tion from the Emancipation Proclama
tion through women's suffrage to birth
control.
These past appeals to the
naturally proper have proven to be
nothing more than excuses for main
taining the status quo or for promot
ing personal preferences.
There is
no reason to believe that such appeals
are anything but excuses in the dis
cussion of our obligations to animals,
either.
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Working
toward
preventi~g
predation would merely be an applica
tion of a common human activity which
is not ordinarily regarded as unnatu
ral or an expression of the sin of
pride.
We routi nely interfere with
nature to protect ourselves (and other
animals, too) from such threats to life
and limb as flooding rivers, diseases,
erosion, storms, birth defects, infec
tions, avalanches, pestilence, epidem
ics,
and decay.
I nterferi ng with
nature in an attempt to make the
world a happier, more fulfilling, less
dangerous place to live is a part of
being human.
Admittedly, we have
not always pursued this project suc
cessfully or even wisely, but particu
lar failures and stupidities do not
demonstrate that the project itself is
somehow unnatural, an offense against
God, oran attempt by us to overstep
"our assigned place" in the world
(allowing, for the purposes of argu
ment, that it even ma kes sense to use
such a phrase).
Since this sort of objection is often
exp res sed in at least superficially
religious terms and probably makes
sense only in a religious context,
some sort of appeal
to religious
authority would seem to be the most
likely way of trying to support it.
However, if we turn to Judeo-Chris
tian scripture, we find that God gave
humans dominion over the earth and
all that live upon it.
No matter how
one interprets "dominion," from abso
lute power to stewardship, it follows
that God has, at the least, given us
permission to manage nature.
Fur
thermore, since this scripture also
claims that God is a creator and that
humans have been created in His
image, it wou Id seem to follow that in
exercis i ng ou r
domin ion over the
earth, we can be expected to re-cre
ate it to some deg ree- -and that re
creation is not limited by a command
ment stati n g "T hou s h a,lt not i nte rfe re
with predation!" Judeo-Christian tra
dition thus does not support the
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contention that it would be improper
for us to attempt to prevent preda
tion.
Of course, there are other scrip
tures besides the Bible, but it would
certainly be out of place even to
attempt to survey them here. We may
simply note that if there are conflict
ing religious teachings on this issue,
that fact, along with the notorious
difficulties involved in trying to find
rational grounds for choosing among
competing religious traditions, is suf
ficient to blunt the force of this
objection to ou r having an obligation
to prevent predation.
Consequently,
. it seems fa i r to concl ude that the
charge
that
(3')
is
"unnaturally
absurd" either is merely rhetorical,
does not fit with common practice and
draws unwarranted conclusions from
our past failures, or is unwarranted
by the religious context needed to
make it at all sensible. Whichever the
option, when interpreted as a charge
of unnatural absurdity, (4) is left
unwarranted.
Thus, at the very least, it is not
at all clear that the evaluation in (4)
is warranted.
Since a reductio ad
absurdum argument
relies on
the
absurdity of the proposed conclusion
bei ng blatant, it follows that the p re
dation reductio of human obligations to
animals fails.
Of the reasons just offered for this
failure, perhaps the one with the
greatest
general
import
is
that
although something may be impractical
as an immediate goal of ou r moral
endeavors, that does not disqualify it
from being a useful moral ideal guid
ing what we can accomplish.
The
spectre of gross impracticality seems
to be what underlies the feeling that
there is something absurd in the idea
of humans being obligated to prevent
predation.
Recognizing that an unat
tainable condition may still serve as a
useful guiding ideal for what is at-

E&A V/2
tainable disperses this spectre by
giving practical import to the unattai
nable and showing that an obligation
is not absurd just because it com
mands us to pursue what we cannot
attain.
II.
Would an obligation to prevent
avoidable animal suffering entail an
obligation to prevent predation?
Through the years, moral philoso
phers have agreed with Aristotle that
ethics is "a practical science," but
just what is involved in a science
being a practical' one is not well-es
tablished. A classical ideal, exempli
fied in Plato's Republic and Spinoza's
Ethics, is that reason functions in
fundamentally the same way in all
areas, with only the subject matters
and the conclusions being different,
the conclusion of theoretical reasoning
being knowledge, while the conclusion
of practical reasoning is action.
On
the other hand, contemporary, non
cognitivist meta-ethical theories point
toward fundamental differences in the
operations of reason in practical and
theoretical endeavours.
I find the
non-cognitivist analysis more credible
than the classical ideal, and what I
want to suggest here is that there is
a rule for practical reasoning which
renders one kind of reductio invalid
in practical contexts, even thoug h
that kind of argument does not violate
the general rules of logic. The effect
of this rule will be to render a certain
critical strategy fallacious in practical
contexts, such as ethics.
This rule is suggested by a recent
response to one of the standa rd criti
cisms of utilitarianism. That criticism
of utilitarianism has taken the form of
imagining some Brave New World which
seems to fulfill the principle of utility
but which is intuitively unacceptable.
This is supposed to provide a reductio
of utilitarianism.
For example, envi
ronmental
eth icists
have criticized
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utilitarianism on the grounds that if
we were capable of replaci ng natu re
wit hap Ia s tic en vi ro n men t w hi c h 9 a ve
as much happiness as the natural one
to all sentient beings involved (some
thing we are not even near being able
to do), then the principle of utility
cou Id not generate a n obligation for
us to favor the natural environment
over the plastic one. A recent line of
response to this sort of criticism has
been to deny the relevance of such
imaginative constructions by arguing
that since utilitarianism is a moral
philosophy for working with the prob
lems of the world in which we actually
live, it must be evaluated on the basis
of how it in st ructs us to dea I with
real, not imaginary, problems and
possibilities. s Thus, this defense of
utilitarianism undercuts a line of criti
cism by emphasizing the practicality of
ethics, and this takes the form of
confining the domain of inference from
the principle of utility to matters of
contemporary concern and possible
response.
I find this defense of utilitarianism
thoroughly appropriate, since I find
science fiction and "worst conceivable
case" criticisms of ethical principles to
miss the point of doing ethics, a
practical science, altogether.
I want
to suggest here a Kantian analogue to
this defense of utilitarianism. What I
propose is that "ought implies can" be
interpreted as a rule for practical
reasoning, and I offer the following as
a formu lation of that ru Ie:
An

argument of the form "P,
Q, R,
. . Y /Therefore 5
ought to z" is val id only if "5
can z" is true. 6
Just how "can" is to be interpreted
and just how we are to determine
whether "s can z" is true,
shall
leave at the intuitive level.
Detailed
responses to these issues would likely
require different answers for different
cases, e.g., cases involving specific
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imperatives vs. those involving gen
eral imperatives, would also have to
grapple with the issue of "can attain"
vs. "can work toward," and, fortu
nately, are not necessary to deal with
the issue at hand, the. predation

reductio.
In the previous section, we dis
cussed several different
kinds of
reductios, d ifferentiati ng them on the
basis of the way in which the pro
posed conclusion is supposed to be
absurd. The above rule for practical
reason i ng does not affect most of
those ki nds of reductios, but it does
affect those of the form:
If P were true, S would be
obligated to do something he/
she
cannot
do,
which
is
absurd.
According to the above rule, this
practical reductio does not discredit
P.
Rather, the inference from P to
liS ought to z" is invalid precisely
because "s can z" is false. That is,
in a practical science, i.e., one which
(among other things) adopts the above
rule
of
reasoning,
the
practical
reductio is not an available line of
criticism. This is because in a prac
tical science, it is not the case that
inferences to impractical obligations
are valid but unsound, as they would
have to be for a legitimate reductio.
Rather, . such inferences are simply
invalid. 7
Of course, this conclusion depends
on the above rule (or something very
much like it) being acceptable, and
while having special rules of inference
for limited domains of reasoning is
unproblematic, it might be objected
that a rule of reasoning which bases
the validity of an inference on some
thing being true confuses logical with
factual issues. From the viewpoint of
theoretical reason i ng, such a criticism
might be well-taken, but if one's con
cern
is
practical,
then
keeping
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inferences in touch with the facts of
the world is not confusion but reason
ableness.
Limiting our concern to
real problems and possibilities is at
least an important part of what it
means to be "practical," and what the
above rule for practical reasoning
does is to make a logical contribution
to specifying that practical attitude.
Consequently, it would be a category
mistake to criticize that rule for not
employing the distinction between log
ical and factual issues employed in
admittedly non -practical contexts. 8
Retu rn i ng to the predation reduc
tio, the analysis of the previous sec
tion indicates that if (3') is absurd, it
is because it contains an obligation we
cannot fulfill.
Consequently, if the
predation reductio is to succeed, it
must be as a practical reductio,
rather than as a logical reductio, fac
tual reductio, etc.
But since this is
an ethical issue, the rules of practical
reasoning apply, including the pro
hi b ition agai n st imp racti ca I . i nfe rences .
Consequently, if (3') is impractical,
(1) and (2) do not entail (3'). That
is, if we cannot prevent predation,
the above rule for practical reasoning
tells us that our obligation to alleviate
,avoidable
animal
suffering
cannot
entail an obligation to prevent preda
tion. Thus, the predation reductio is
fallacious.
The very thing that was
supposed to render (3') absurd actu
ally renders the inference from (1)
and (2) to (3') invalid.
Of course, the analysis of the pre
vious section indicates that an obliga
tion to prevent predation wou Id not be
impractical, even though completely
eliminating predation might be impos
sible. So, the above rule for practi
cal reasoning may not be necessary to
save ou r obligation to alleviate avoida
ble animal suffering from the preda
tion reductio. . Nonetheless, I th ink
the analysis of this section is espe
cially important, not only as a back
stop, should some flaw be found in

E&A V/2

our handling of practicality in the
fi rst section, but also because the
practical ru Ie of inference developed
here expresses the proper role for
practical absurdity in ethics. Imprac
tical inferences do not discredit ethi
cal principles; such inferences mark
the boundaries of ethical concern. We
shall develop this idea further in the
next section.

III. If an obligation to alleviate avoi
dable animal suffering entailed an
obi igation to prevent predation and if
the latter obligation would be absurd,
would it follow that we are not obli
gated to alleviate avoidable animal
suffering?
When we find that· a hypothesis
leads to an unacceptable conclusion,
we need not simply infer that the
hypothesis
is
also
unacceptable.
Rather, the conclusion may be used as
a guide for discovering what is wrong
with the hypothesis, how we should
interpret the hypothesis,
how we
might revise the hypothesis, or what
is and what is not covered by that
hypothesis. If, in spite of the analy
ses of the previous sections, we
accept (1) through (4) in the preda
tion reductio, that argument falls
under the last of these options. That
is, rather than discrediting (1), the
predation reductio helps show us what
is and what is not covered by ou r
obligation to alleviate avoidable animal
suffering.
I n the fi rst section, we discovered
that (4) is ambiguous and that the
only substantive interpretation of it
would be more clearly formulated as
follows:
(4') That we ought to prevent
predation would be an imprac
tical obligation.
(4')

clearly

indicates

that

what

is
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(supposedly) absurd about the obliga
obliga
tion in (3') is that it is beyond our
power to fulfill that obligation. But if
we ca n not prevent predation, - it fol
fol
lows that the suffering of animals who
are preyed upon by other animals is
not avoidable suffering and, there
there
fore, is not covered by ou r obligation
to alleviate avoidable animal suffering.
Therefore, the conclusion to be drawn
from (1) through (4') is not (5) but
the following:
(5') Therefore, animal suffer
suffer
i ng due to predation is not
included among the cases of
animal suffering which humans
are obligated to alleviate.
Saying that predation is unavoida
unavoida
ble may strike some as being as sim
sim
plistic and self-serving as saying that
eating meat is necessary for human
health and happiness. However, while
predation that is avoidable, e. g. ,
predation by our pets, may escape the
argument of the preceding paragraph,
it will not help salvage the predation
reductio. Any predation that is avoi
avoi
dable in the sense at issue here,
namely, "preventable by humans," is
not something it would be practically
absu!rd for us to be obligated to pre
pre
vent.
Therefore, predation covered
by (1) is not covered by (4'). So, in
every case, either the predation is
not covered by (1), or it is not cov
cov
ered: by (4').
Consequently, in no
case can (1) through (4') justify
(5).~

Of course, the point still remains
that not all predation is unavoidable.
But we now know the practical con-

elusion to be drawn from th is:
Where we can prevent preda
preda
tion
without occasioning as
much or more suffering than
we would prevent, we are obli
obli
gated to do so by the principle
that we are obligated to allevi
allevi
ate avoidable animal suffering.
Where
we
cannot
prevent
predation or ca n not do· so
without occasioning as much or
more suffering than we would
prevent, that principle does
not obi igate us to attempt to
prevent predation. 10
While that is the specific moral of
this story, the general moral that
runs through all three of the above
analyses is that while a concern with
practicality is certainly relevant in
ethical disputations, exactly how the
issue of practicality figures into ethi
ethi
cal deliberations is not immediately
obvious and is in need of careful
reflection
and
clarification.
Such
clarification may involve carefully dif
dif
ferentiating the ways in which differ
differ
ent elements of ou r moral theories
work, e.g., differentiating unattaina
unattaina
ble moral ideals from attainable moral
goals, as was done in section I.
Or
it may involve recognizing that there
are rules for practical reasoning not
found in theoretical reasoning, such
as the rule discussed in section II.
Or it may involve clarifying a!T!bigui
a!T!bigui
ties in key terms related to practical
practical
ity, as was done with "avoidable" in
section III. Whichever of these pro
pro
cedures is followed,
the issue of
practicality will be treated as a guide
for moral concern, rather than as an
occasion for ridiculing that concern.

Steve F. Sapontzis
California State University, Hayward
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Notes
1.
For an extended discussion of
this point, see my "Moral Value and
Reason," The Monist 66/1 (1983), pp.
146-159.
2. Critically discussing arguments
concerning what is due the natural is
made difficult by the strong, positive
evaluative meaning of "natural" in its
opposition to "artificial," "distorted,"
"disguised," "polluted,"
and other
such terms.
But, of course, to the
degree that an argument trades on
that evaluative meaning of the term, it
begs the question of the respect due
the "natural," in the sense of the
term which is descriptive and refers
to the native, instinctual, biological,
unmanufactured, etc.
3.
Aldo Leopold, A Sand County
Almanac (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1949), pp. 224-225.
4.
Immanuel Kant, Critique of
Practical Reason, Book II, Chapter II,
Part IV.
5. R. M. Ha re develops th is sort
of defense of utilitarianism in "Ethical
Theory and Utilitarianism," in Con
temporary British Philosophy, volume
4, ed. H. D. Lewis (London: Allen
and Unwin, 1976).
6.
I suspect that logically speci
fying "ought implies can" as a princi
ple
of practical
reasoning
would
require elaborating a whole family of
rules for practical reasoning.
For
example, in addition to the above
inference rule, there must also be a
selection rule 'like '''s ought to z' is a
basic moral principle only if'S can z'
'is true."
Fortunately, it is not nec
essary to produce the entire family in
order to deal with the predation
reductio.
7.
Since it is doubtful that a

practical reductio would be of any use
ina non - p racti ca I context, it follows
that the practical reductio is probably
an altogether worthless form of criti
cism.
8. We may also note that basing
the validity of inferences on factual
considerations is not unheard of even
in the theoretical sciences. The most
obvious example of this is the "exis
tential hypothesis" that "There exists
at least one member of S" is true,
which is required if the immediate
inference from "All S are P" to "Some
S are P" is to be valid.
Perhaps
Aristotle's presumption of the existen
tial hypothesis is a testimony to his
belief that even logic should be prac
tical.
9.
In line with the discussion of
contextual absurdity in the first sec
tion, it might be a rgued that "avoida
ble" in (1) should be interpreted as
"preventable by humans without occa
sioning equal or greater suffering."
This interpretation would support the
point being made here just as well as
the shorter interpretation just dis
cussed.
Using the expanded inter
pretation of "avoidable" wou Id requ ire
that we interpret (4) as follows:
(4
That we ought to pre
vent predation would be an
obligation to occasion as much
or more suffering as we would
prevent.
11

)

It follows that any case of preda
tion covered by (1) would not be cov
ered by (4") and vice versa. So, (1)
through (4
could not support (5)
any more than can (1) through (4').
11

)

10.
Once such an obligation is
acknowledged, further issues must be
considered in determining how much
and what sort of effort should be
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devoted to fulfilling it.
Among these
issues is whether we will do more
good by attempting to fulfill this obli
obligation or by seeking to alleviate other
forms of avoidable animal suffering.
Other than by preventing predation
by ani ma Isun de r 0 u r co n t ro I , e. g . ,
pets, it seems likely that for the for
forseeable future, animal rights activists
will do better by directing their
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organized efforts on behalf of animals
toward
alleviating
the
suffering
humans
cause
animals
than
by
attempti ng to prevent predation among
animals.
Perhaps this question of
where one can do the most good is the
most substantive question concern i ng
the practicality of an obligation to
prevent predation.

